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1. Moral agency means: free willed persons having the ability to choose between good and evil, and they willingly choose good and defend good. Free will means: the ability to choose between good and evil. A person having free will may choose evil. Thus, all moral agents have free will, but not all free willed have moral agency. Share.
benlogos. 261 1 2 5. Moral agency is an individual's ability to make moral judgments based on some commonly held notion of right and wrong and to be held accountable for these actions. A moral agent is "a being who is capable of acting with reference to right and wrong." Source.
3. Philosophically speaking, 'agency' is a euphemism for the concept of free will, a euphemism meant to sidestep all of the knotty problems that arise whenever one talks about free will. With that in mind, an 'agent' is anything that senses its environment and makes (implicitly non-deterministic) alterations in its state.
Likewise a man falling into the water, (a bridge breaking under him,) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is ...
Agent: An entity capable of starting new causal chains of events. Agent-causation means that the cause for an action is not the previous event, but instead a decision made by the agent. Therefore agent-causation is practically the same thing as free will. There may be philosophical nuances, but for a layman they mean the same.
1. Given open theism, an omniscient being would not know what a free agent will do since what a free agent will do is not something that is knowable until the free agent does it. This does not contradict omniscience defined as knowing everything that is knowable. It does challenge one to be precise about what “knowable reality” actually is.
Nietzsche suggests that, in reality, a will can never be absolutely "free" or "unfree"—rather, any particular will is going to be strong or weak to some actual degree, ruling indeed though ruled in turn. So (he claims) our "free will" is a "boorish simplicity, a long folly, owing to our extravagant pride"—from Beyond Good and Evil:
1. Compatibilism maintains (roughly): If you could choose differently, then you would act differently (thus keeping some notion of "free will") You cannot, however, choose differently (thus keeping with deterministic physics) Therefore, we can view free will as being "compatible" with "hard" determinism.
The moral self for Kant is the self that is noumenal and that can act freely unbuffetted by the deterministic world. This is the background apparatus for answering your question. On Kant's view, the self as a moral self is not in the world of nature. Instead, the self is in a world where it is free. And the reason why we don't see that is that ...
Depending on which work you are looking at in Kant's moral philosophy, the basis of the claim that we are free is different. Critique of Pure Reason -> An antinomy shows that we cannot know we are free, but we live that we are free. Reason is free and distinct from understanding. Groundwork -> Part III is an argument that we are somehow free ...